[cs-talks] Upcoming Seminars: NRG (Mon) + PhD Proposal (Tue) + BUSec (Wed)

cs, Group cs at bu.edu
Fri Feb 27 15:22:25 EST 2015

NRG Seminar
SIMPLE-fying Middlebox Policy Enforcement Using SDN
Nabeel Akhtar, BU
Monday, March 2, 2015 at 1pm in MCS 148

Abstract: Networks today rely on middleboxes to provide critical performance, security, and policy compliance capabilities. Achieving these benefits and ensuring that the traffic is directed through the desired sequence of middleboxes requires significant manual effort and operator expertise. In this respect, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) offers a promising alternative. Middleboxes, however, introduce new aspects (e.g., policy composition, resource management, packet modifications) that fall outside the purvey of traditional L2/L3 functions that SDN supports (e.g., access control or routing). This paper presents SIMPLE, a SDN-based policy enforcement layer for efficient middlebox-specific “traffic steering”. In designing SIMPLE, we take an explicit stance to work within the constraints of legacy middleboxes and existing SDN interfaces. To this end, we address algorithmic and system design challenges to demonstrate the feasibility of using SDN to simplify middlebox traffic steering. In doing so, we also take a significant step toward addressing industry concerns surrounding the ability of SDN to integrate with existing infrastructure and support L4–L7 capabilities. Note: Paper is from SIGCOMM 2013 and can be found at http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2013/papers/sigcomm/p27.pdf

Ph.D Proposal
Mikhail Breslav, BU
Tuesday, March 3, 2015 at 2:45pm in MCS 148

Abstract: TBA

BUSec Seminar
Adaptively Secure Two-party Computation From Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Oxana Poburinnaya, BU
Wednesday, March 4, 2015 at 9:30 am in MCS 180 — Hariri Institute Seminar Room

Abstract: A basic challenge in the area of secure distributed computation is to achieve adaptive security, namely security against an adversary that can adaptively decide whom to corrupt during the execution of the protocol. Beyond providing better protection from realistic attacks than security against an adversary that controls a fixed-in-advance set of parties, adaptive security also provides strong resilience against leakage due to side channel attacks. However, all known general function evaluation protocols which provide full adaptive security have round complexity proportional to the circuit depth of the function. This is the case even with two-party protocols and even for honest-but-curious corruptions. We present the first two-round, two-party general function evaluation protocol that is secure against honest-but-curious adaptive corruption of both parties. In addition, the protocol is incoercible for one of the parties, and fully leakage tolerant. It requires a global (non-programmable) reference string and is based on one way functions and general-purpose indistinguishability obfuscation with sub-exponential security, as well as augmented non-committing encryption. A Byzantine version of the protocol, obtained by applying the CLOS compiler, achieves UC security with comparable efficiency parameters, but is no longer incoercible. The protocol uses Yao's garbled circuits and the Sahai-Waters puncturable deterministic encryption which allows embedding hidden triggers in a random-looking string. This is joint work with Ran Canetti and Shafi Goldwasser.
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