<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="color:#000000">Muthu&#39;s talk on 4-round MPC is today at 2pm at BU, Hariri seminar room!</div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div><b style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px">Title</b><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px">: Round-Optimal Secure Multi-Party Computation</span><br></div><b>Speaker</b>: Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam<div><div><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><b>Date</b>: Wed 11/29, 2-4pm</span></div><div><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><b>Location</b>: <div class="gmail_default" style="color:rgb(0,0,0);display:inline">​Hariri Seminar room​</div></span></div><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><b>Abstract</b>: Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a central cryptographic task that allows a set of mutually distrustful parties to jointly compute some function of their private inputs where security should hold in the presence of an active adversary that can corrupt any number of parties. Despite extensive research, the precise round complexity of this “standard-bearer” cryptographic primitive is unknown. Recently, Garg, Mukherjee, Pandey, and Polychroniadou, in Eurocrypt 2016 demonstrated that the round complexity of any MPC protocol relying on black-box proofs of security in the plain model must be at least four. Following this work, independently Ananth, Choudhuri and Jain, CRYPTO 2017 and Brakerski, Halevi, and Polychroniadou, TCC 2017 made progress towards solving this question and constructed four-round protocols based on non-polynomial time assumptions. </span><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><br>In this work, we resolve this question by designing the first four-round actively secure multi-party (two or more parties) protocol for general functionalities under standard polynomial-time hardness assumptions with a black-box proof of security. <br><div class="m_-8019672806558207449m_-9137649202932945736gmail-page" title="Page 1"><div class="m_-8019672806558207449m_-9137649202932945736gmail-layoutArea"><div class="m_-8019672806558207449m_-9137649202932945736gmail-column"></div></div></div></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px">Joint work with Shai Halevi, Carmit Hazay, and Antigoni Polychroniadou</div></div></div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">

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