[Busec] Final cryptoday of the year: May 12 @ BU

Ran Canetti canetti at bu.edu
Wed May 3 22:11:13 EDT 2017


<https://bostoncryptoday.wordpress.com/>

Charles River Crypto Day <https://bostoncryptoday.wordpress.com/>

May 12 2017

Hariri Seminar Room

111 Cummington Mall room 180, BU

_*To help us plan for food, please register  Here * 
<https://docs.google.com/forms/d/12MUwHf06zFF2vt279vglCi7nmmIMOI3NOBliKPRtk8U/viewform?ts=5909dda9&edit_requested=true>_


_<https://docs.google.com/forms/d/12MUwHf06zFF2vt279vglCi7nmmIMOI3NOBliKPRtk8U/viewform?ts=5909dda9&edit_requested=true>_

_Program (See abstracts below)_

_
_

9:30-10 Breakfast

10-10:50: Raluca Ada Popa, Berkeley: An Oblivious and Encrypted 
Distributed Analytics Platform

11-11:50: Justin Holmgren, MIT: Delegation with nearly minimal 
time-space overhead

12-13:30 Lunch (provided)

13:30-14:20: Fabrice Ben Hamouda: On the Robustness of Non-Interactive 
Multi-Party Computation

14:30-15:20: Abhi Shelat, NEU: Full accounting for verifiable outsourcing

Break

15:50-16:40: Eran Tromer, TAU and Columbia U:PhotoProof: Cryptographic 
Image Authentication for Any Set of Permissible Transformations

16:50:Ushering of Summer

_*To help us plan for food, please register  Here * 
<https://docs.google.com/forms/d/12MUwHf06zFF2vt279vglCi7nmmIMOI3NOBliKPRtk8U/viewform?ts=5909dda9&edit_requested=true>_

An Oblivious and Encrypted Distributed Analytics Platform

Raluca Ada Popa, Berkeley

Abstract

Many systems run rich data analytics on sensitive data in the cloud, but 
are prone to data breaches. A recent hardware enclave architecture 
promises data confidentiality and isolated execution of arbitrary 
computations, yet still suffers from leakage due to memory and network 
accesses patterns. In this talk, I will describe Opaque, a distributed 
data analytics platform supporting a wide range of queries while 
protecting the data. Even a compromised operating system sees only 
encrypted data. Opaque also protects against leakage from memory and 
network accesses outside of the enclave (a property called 
obliviousness). To accomplish this goal, Opaque introduces new 
distributed oblivious relational operators, as well as new query 
planning techniques to optimize these new operators. Opaque is 
implemented on Spark SQL with few changes to the underlying system. 
Opaque provides data encryption, authentication, and computation 
verification with a performance ranging from 52% faster to 3.3x slower 
than vanilla Spark SQL; obliviousness comes with a 1.6–46x overhead. At 
the same time, Opaque provides an improvement of three orders of 
magnitude over state-of-the-art oblivious protocols.

Joint work with W. Zheng, A. Dave, J. G. Beekman, J. E. Gonzalez, and I. 
Stoica.

Delegation with nearly minimal time-space overhead

Justin Holmgren, MIT

Consider a scenario in which a client wants to utilize a powerful, but 
untrusted, server to perform computations which are beyond the client's 
ability. Since the client does not trust the server, we would like the 
server to certify the correctness of the result. We would like the 
verification procedure to be extremely efficient, whereas the complexity 
of proving shouldn’t be much larger than that of computing.

Assuming LWE, we construct a one-round argument-system for proving the 
correctness of any time T and space S computation, in which both the 
verifier and prover are extremely efficient. In particular, the prover 
runs in time T * poly(k) and space S + poly(k), where k is a security 
parameter.

Our result builds on a line of work initiated by Kalai et al. (STOC, 
2014). The prover in all of these works runs in time T^c for a large 
constant c (where c is at least 3). As an additional contribution we 
significantly simplify a central construct that appears in all of these 
works.

Joint work with Ron Rothblum

On the Robustness of Non-Interactive Multi-Party Computation

Fabrice Ben Hamouda, IBM

Non-Interactive Multiparty Computation (Beimel et al., Crypto 2014) is a

very powerful notion equivalent (under some corruption model) to garbled

circuits, Private Simultaneous Messages protocols, and obfuscation. We

present robust solutions to the problem of Non-Interactive Multiparty

Computation in the computational and information-theoretic models. Our

results include the first efficient and robust protocols to compute any

function in NC1 for constant-size collusions, in the

information-theoretic setting and in the computational setting, to

compute any function in P for constant-size collusions, assuming the

existence of one-way functions. Our constructions start from a Private

Simultaneous Messages construction (Feige, Killian Naor, STOC 1994 and

Ishai, Kushilevitz, ISTCS 1997) and transform it into a Non-Interactive

Multiparty Computation for constant-size collusions.

We also present a new Non-Interactive Multiparty Computation protocol

for symmetric functions with significantly better communication

complexity compared to the only known one of Beimel et al.

This is a joint work with Hugo Krawczyk and Tal Rabin.

Full accounting for verifiable outsourcing

Abhi Shelat, NEU

Systems for verifiable outsourcing incur costs for a \emph{prover}, a 
\emph{verifier}, and precomputation; outsourcing makes sense when these

costs are cheaper than not outsourcing. Yet, prover costs are generally 
ignored.The only exception is Verifiable ASICs~(VA), wherein the prover 
is a custom chip; however, the only prior VA system ignores the cost of 
precomputation.

This paper describes a new VA system, called Giraffe; charges Giraffe 
for all three costs; and identifies regimes where outsourcing is 
worthwhile. Giraffe's base is an interactive proof geared to data 
parallel computation. Giraffe makes this protocol \emph{asymptotically 
optimal} for the prover, i.e., for a large enough batch size, the 
prover’s running time is linear in the total number of gates in the 
arithmetic circuit (whereas prior work incurs an extra log(width of 
circuit) factor).

Giraffe wins even when outsourcing several tens of sub-computations, 
scales to $500\times$ larger computations than prior work, and can 
profitably outsource \emph{parts} of programs that are not worthwhile to 
outsource in full.



PhotoProof: Cryptographic Image Authentication for Any Set of 
Permissible Transformations


Eran Tromer (Tel Aviv University and Columbia University)



Authenticating images that claim to depict real events is desirable in 
many context. Some cameras already attach digital signatures to 
photographs, but plain signatures become invalid when the image 
undergoes legitimate processing such as cropping, rotation, 
brightness-adjustment or compression. Prior attempts to address this 
need had inadequate functionality and/or security.

We present PhotoProof, a new approach to image authentication based on 
cryptographic proofs. It can be configured according to application 
requirements, to allow any permissible set of (efficiently computable) 
transformations. Starting with a signed image, the scheme attaches, to 
each legitimately derived image, a succinct proof of computational 
integrity attesting that the transformation was permissible. Anyone can 
verify these proofs, and generate updated proofs when applying further 
permissible transformations. Moreover, the proofs are zero-knowledge so 
that, for example, an authenticated cropped image reveals nothing about 
the cropped-out regions.

PhotoProof is based on Proof-Carrying Data (PCD), a cryptographic 
primitive for verified execution of distributed computations, built on 
top of zero-knowledge SNARK proofs. We will discuss the scheme, its 
implementation, and possible extensions to other forms of data provenance.

Joint with with Assa Naveh.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://cs-mailman.bu.edu/pipermail/busec/attachments/20170503/f6a41726/attachment-0001.html>


More information about the Busec mailing list