[Busec] CryptoDay is tomorrow at MSR!

Sharon Goldberg sharon.goldbe at gmail.com
Thu Feb 16 15:56:17 EST 2017


Reminder: Cryptoday is happening tomorrow at MSR!


On Sun, Feb 12, 2017 at 12:25 PM, Vinod Vaikuntanathan <
vinod.nathan at gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear Friends,
>
> Join us for the first Charles River Crypto Day of this year!
>
> *When:* *Friday Feb 17*
>
> *Where: **Microsoft Research New England*.
> Clara Barton Room (First Floor),
> One Memorial Drive, Cambridge MA 02142.
>
> *Why: Experience CRYPTOMANIA*™ *with five great speakers!*
>
> See https://bostoncryptoday.wordpress.com/ or below for details.
>
> See you all there!
>
> best,
> Ron/Yael/Daniel/Vinod
>
>
>
> *SCHEDULE:*
>
> 9:30-10 COFFEE and INTRODUCTIONS
>
> 10-11 Tal Rabin, IBM Research
> Privacy-Preserving Search of Similar Patients in Genomic Data
>
> 11-12 Yevgeniy Dodis, NYU
> Fixing Cracks in the Concrete: Random Oracles with Auxiliary Input,
> Revisited
>
> 12-1:30 lunch
>
> 1:30-2:30 Mark Zhandry, Princeton
> The Magic of ELFs
>
> 2:30-3:30 Chris Peikert, Michigan
> Pseudo-randomness of Ring-LWE for any Ring and Modulus
>
> 3:30-4 Coffee Break
>
> 4-5 Hoeteck Wee, CNRS and ENS
> "Real Cryptographers don't use Obfuscation"
>
>
>
>
> TITLE: Privacy-Preserving Search of Similar Patients in Genomic Data
>
> SPEAKER: Tal Rabin, IBM Research
>
> ABSTRACT:
>
> The growing availability of genomic data holds great promise for
> advancing medicine and research, but unlocking its full potential requires
> adequate methods for protecting the privacy of individuals whose genome
> data we use. One example of this tension is running Similar Patient Query
> on remote genomic data: In this setting a doctor that holds the genome of
> his/her patient may try to find other individuals with “close” genomic data
> (in edit distance), and use the data of these individuals to help diagnose
> and find effective treatment for that patient’s conditions. This is clearly
> a desirable mode of operation, however, the privacy exposure implications
> are considerable, so we would like to carry out the above “closeness”
> computation in a privacy preserving manner.
>
> In this work we put forward a new approach for highly efficient
> edit-distance approximation that works well even in settings with much
> higher divergence. We present contributions both in the design of the
> approximation method itself and in the protocol for computing it privately.
>
> We also implemented our system. There is a preprocessing step which takes
> 11-15 seconds and then each query can be answered in 1-2 second depending
> on the database size.
>
> Joint work with Gilad Asharov, Shai Halevi, and Yehuda Lindell.
>
>
> TITLE: Fixing Cracks in the Concrete: Random Oracles with Auxiliary
> Input, Revisited
>
> SPEAKER: Yevgeniy Dodis, New York University
>
> ABSTRACT:
>
> We revisit security proofs for various cryptographic primitives in the
> random oracle model with *auxiliary input* (ROM-AI): a (computationally
> unbounded) attacker A can compute arbitrary S bits of leakage z=z(O) about
> the random oracle O *before* attacking the system, and then use additional
> T *oracle* queries to O *during* the attack. This model was explicitly
> studied by Unruh in 2007 (CRYPTO 2007), but dates back to the seminal paper
> of Hellman in 1980 about time-space tradeoffs for inverting random
> functions, and has natural applications in settings where traditional
> random oracle proofs are not useful: (a) security against non-uniform
> attackers; (b) space-time tradeoffs; (c) security against preprocessing;
> (d) resilience to backdoors in hash functions.
>
> We obtain a number of new results about ROM-AI, but our main message is
> that ROM-AI is the "new cool kid in town": it nicely connects theory and
> practice, has a lot of exciting open questions, leads to beautiful math,
> short definitions, elegant proofs, surprising algorithms, and is still in
> its infancy. In short, you should work on it!
>
> Joint Work with Siyao Guo and Jonathan Katz.
>
>
> TITLE: The Magic of ELFs
>
> SPEAKER: Mark Zhandry, Princeton
>
> ABSTRACT:
>
> We introduce the notion of an Extremely Lossy Function (ELF). An ELF is a
> family of functions with an image size that is tunable anywhere from
> injective to having a polynomial-sized image. Moreover, for any efficient
> adversary, for a sufficiently large polynomial r (necessarily chosen to be
> larger than the running time of the adversary), the adversary cannot
> distinguish the injective case from the case of image size r.
>
> We develop a handful of techniques for using ELFs, and show that such
> extreme lossiness is useful for instantiating random oracles in several
> settings. In particular, we show how to use ELFs to build secure point
> function obfuscation with auxiliary input, as well as polynomially-many
> hardcore bits for any one-way function. Such applications were previously
> known from strong knowledge assumptions — for example polynomially-many
> hardcore bits were only know from differing inputs obfuscation, a notion
> whose plausibility has been seriously challenged. We also use ELFs to build
> a simple hash function with output intractability, a new notion we define
> that may be useful for generating common reference strings.
>
> Next, we give a construction of ELFs relying on the exponential hardness
> of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, which is plausible in elliptic
> curve groups. Combining with the applications above, our work gives several
> practical constructions relying on qualitatively different — and arguably
> better — assumptions than prior works.
>
>
>
> TITLE: Pseudorandomness of Ring-LWE for Any Ring and Modulus
>
> SPEAKER: Chris Peikert, University of Michigan
>
> ABSTRACT:
>
> Our main result is a quantum polynomial-time reduction from worst-case
> problems on ideal lattices to the *decision* version of Learning With
> Errors over Rings (Ring-LWE), for *any number ring* and *any modulus*
> that is not too small (relative to the error rate).  Such a reduction was
> previously known for the *search* version of Ring-LWE, but hardness of
> the decision version---which is typically needed for cryptographic
> applications---was only known to hold for the special case of Galois
> number rings, such as cyclotomics. The new reduction at least matches,
> and in some cases improves upon, the parameters obtained in prior work
> for both the search and decision problems.
>
> Our approach also applies to the original Learning With Errors (LWE)
> problem, yielding a quantum reduction from worst-case problems on general lattices
> to decision LWE, again matching or improving upon the parameters obtained
> by all prior reductions.
>
> Joint work with Oded Regev and Noah Stephens-Davidowitz.
>
>
> TITLE: "Real cryptographers don't use obfuscation"
>
> SPEAKER: Hoeteck Wee, CNRS and ENS Paris
>
> ABSTRACT:
>
> In this talk, I will provide a survey of several recent works showing how
> to use pairing groups to "compile" private-key primitives to public-key
> ones.
>

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-- 
---
Sharon Goldberg
Computer Science, Boston University
http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe
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