[Busec] [BUsec] today Silas Richelson, BU & MIT (10am at HARIRI)

Foteini Baldimtsi foteini at baldimtsi.com
Wed Nov 4 08:21:45 EST 2015


Just a reminder for today's BUsec talk. Today we are hosting Silas
Richelson who is a joint BU & MIT post-doc. Silas will talk about his work
onTopology-Hiding Computation.

The talk was originally scheduled to be at MCS 148 but it is moved back to
*Hairiri.*

See you all at 10am.

Foteini


BUsec Calendar:  http://www.bu.edu/cs/busec/
BUsec Mailing list: http://cs-mailman.bu.edu/mailman/listinfo/busec

The busec seminar gratefully acknowledges the support of BU's Center for
Reliable Information Systems and Cyber Security (RISCS).


*****

Title: Topology-Hiding Computation
Silas Richelson, BU & MIT
Hariri
Wednesday Nov. 4th, 10-11am

Abstract:

Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) is one of the foundational
achievements of modern cryptography, allowing multiple, distrusting,
parties to jointly compute a function of their inputs, while revealing
nothing but the output of the function. Following the seminal works of Yao
and Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson and Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson,
the study of MPC has expanded to consider a wide variety of questions,
including variants in the attack model, underlying assumptions, complexity
and composability of the resulting protocols.

One question that appears to have received very little attention, however,
is that of MPC over an underlying communication network whose structure is,
in itself, sensitive information. This question, in addition to being of
pure theoretical interest, arises naturally in many contexts: designing
privacy-preserving social-networks, private peer-to-peer computations,
vehicle-to-vehicle networks and the ``internet of things'' are some of the
examples.

In this paper, we initiate the study of ``topology-hiding computation'' in
the computational setting. We give formal definitions in both
simulation-based and indistinguishability-based flavors. We show that, even
for fail-stop adversaries, there are some strong impossibility results.
Despite this, we show that protocols for topology-hiding computation can be
constructed in the semi-honest and fail-stop models, if we somewhat
restrict the set of nodes the adversary may corrupt.



Joint work with Tal Moran and Ilan Orlov
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