[Busec] Tomorrow, Friday, Feb 20: Charles River Crypto Day @ MSR

Sharon Goldberg goldbe at cs.bu.edu
Thu Feb 19 10:23:01 EST 2015


Please join us tomorrow, Friday, February 20 for the next installment of Crypto
Day <https://bostoncryptoday.wordpress.com/> at Microsoft Research, New
England. The schedule and directions are below. Hope to see you there!

Daniel, Vinod, Yael, Nir

> *Location and Arrival Instructions:*
> Microsoft New England Research and Development Center
> One Memorial Drive, Cambridge MA 02142
>
> Upon arrival, be prepared to show a picture ID and sign the Building
> Visitor Log when approaching the Lobby Floor Security Desk. Alert them to
> the name of the event, and ask them to direct you to the appropriate floor.
> The talks will be held the First Floor Conference Center, in the Horace
> Mann Conference Room. Detailed guidance on directions, via car or public
> transportation, is available here
> <http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/labs/newengland/visit.aspx>. Parking
> will be available for the on-site parking garage for $27/day.
>
>
> Program:9:30 – 10:00.Introduction/Coffee10:00 – 11:00.
> Tal Malkin, Columbia
> *The Power of Negations in Cryptography*
> 11:30 – 12:30.Rachel Lin, USCB
> *Constant-Round Concurrent Zero-knowledge from Indistinguishability
> Obfuscation*12:30 – 2:00.Lunch (provided)2:00 – 3:00.Alessandra Scaffuro,
> BU and Northeastern
> *Garbled RAM From One-Way Functions*3:30 – 4:30.Henry Corrigan-Gibbs,
> Stanford
> *Building Anonymous Messaging Systems that ‘Hide the Metadata’*Abstracts:
>
> *Speaker: Tal Malkin *
> *Title: The Power of Negations in Cryptography*
>
> The study of monotonicity and negation complexity for Boolean functions
> has been prevalent in complexity theory as well as in computational
> learning theory, but little attention has been given to it in the
> cryptographic context. Recently, Goldreich and Izsak (2012) have initiated
> a study of whether cryptographic primitives can be monotone, and showed
> that one-way functions can be monotone (assuming they exist), but a
> pseudorandom generator cannot.
>
> In this work, we start by filling in the picture and proving that many
> other basic cryptographic primitives cannot be monotone. We then initiate a
> quantitative study of the power of negations, asking how many negations are
> required. We provide several lower bounds, some of them tight, for various
> cryptographic primitives and building blocks including one-way
> permutations, pseudorandom functions, small-bias generators, hard-core
> predicates, error-correcting codes, and randomness extractors. Among our
> results, we highlight the following.
>
> i) Unlike one-way functions, one-way permutations cannot be monotone.
>
> ii) We prove that pseudorandom functions require log n−O(1) negations
> (which is optimal up to the additive term).
>
> iii) Error-correcting codes with optimal distance parameters require log
> n−O(1) negations (again, optimal up to the additive term).
>
> iv) We prove a general result for monotone functions, showing a lower
> bound on the depth of any circuit with t negations on the bottom that
> computes a monotone function f in terms of the monotone circuit depth of f.
> This result addresses a question posed by Koroth and Sarma (2014) in the
> context of the circuit complexity of the Clique problem.
>
> Joint work with Siyao Guo, Igor Carboni Oliveira, and Alon Rosen.
>
> *Speaker: Rachel Lin *
> *Title: Constant-Round Concurrent Zero-knowledge from Indistinguishability
> Obfuscation*
>
> We present a constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for NP. Our
> protocol relies on the existence of families of collision-resistant hash
> functions, one-way permutations, and indistinguishability obfuscators for
> P/poly (with slightly super-polynomial security).
>
> *Speaker: Alessandra Scafuro*
> *Title: Garbled RAM From One-Way Functions*
>
> Yao’s garbled circuit construction is a fundamental construction in
> cryptography and recent efficiency optimizations have brought it much
> closer to practice. However these constructions work only for circuits and
> garbling a RAM program involves the inefficient process of first converting
> it into a circuit. Towards avoiding this inefficiency, Lu and Ostrovsky
> [Eurocrypt 2013] introduced the notion of “garbled RAM” as a method to
> garble RAM programs directly. It can be seen as a RAM analogue of Yao’s
> garbled circuits such that, the size of the garbled program and the time it
> takes to create and evaluate it, is proportional only to the running time
> on the RAM program rather than its circuit size.
> Known realizations of this primitive, either rely on stronger
> computational assumptions such as the existence of
> Identity-Based Encryption, or rely on one-way functions only but do not
> achieve the aforementioned efficiency [Gentry, Halevi, Lu, Ostrovsky,
> Raykova and Wichs, EUROCRYPT 2014].
>
> In this work we provide the first construction with strictly
> poly-logarithmic overhead in both space and time based only on the minimal
> assumption
> that one-way functions exist.
>
> Join work with Sanjam Garg, Steve Lu and Rafail Ostrovsky.
>
> *Speaker: Henry Corrigan-Gibbs *
> *Title: Building Anonymous Messaging Systems that ‘Hide the Metadata’*
>
> Encryption can protect the contents of a message being sent over an open
> network. In many situations, though, hiding the contents of a communication
> is not enough: parties to a conversation want to conceal the fact that they
> ever communicated. In this talk, I will explain how anonymity-preserving
> messaging systems can help ‘hide the metadata’ pertaining to a conversation
> and I will survey the state of the art in anonymous messaging protocols.
>
> A limitation of existing protocols is that they exhibit computation and
> communication costs that scale linearly with the number of users (i.e., the
> anonymity set size) or they require expensive zero-knowledge proofs. In
> recent work, we have designed Riposte, a new system for anonymous messaging
> that applies private-information-retrieval and secure multi-party
> computation techniques to circumvent these limitations.
>
> An implementation and experimental evaluation of Riposte demonstrates
> that, for latency-tolerant applications, the system can provide near-ideal
> anonymity for groups of millions of users—two orders of magnitude more than
> current systems support. I will conclude the talk with a discussion of open
> problems and directions for future work.
>
> Joint work with: Dan Boneh and David Mazières
>
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-- 
Sharon Goldberg
Computer Science, Boston University
http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe
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