[Busec] busec this week: Siddharth Garg (Wed 10am)

Sharon Goldberg goldbe at cs.bu.edu
Sun Apr 26 16:35:12 EDT 2015


This week's seminar will be the last of the semester. Siddharth Garg will
talk about Integrated Circuit (IC) security and its relation to
obfuscation, work that received a best paper award at USENIX'13. Lunch will
be provided and abstract is below.

Sharon

BUsec Calendar:  http://www.bu.edu/cs/busec/
BUsec Mailing list: http://cs-mailman.bu.edu/mailman/listinfo/busec

The busec seminar gratefully acknowledges the support of BU's Center for
Reliable Information Systems and Cyber Security (RISCS).

*******

Title:  "Secure Integrated Circuit (IC) Fabrication Using Obfuscation"
Speaker: Siddharth Garg, NYU Poly
Wednesday April 29, 10am, the Hariri Seminar room

Abstract: For economic reasons, the fabrication of digital ICs is
increasingly outsourced. This comes at the expense of trust - the untrusted
fabrication facility ("foundry") could pirate the intellectual property of
the IC designer, or worse, maliciously modify the IC to  leak secret
information from the chip or sabotage its functionality.

In this talk, I will present my recent work on two defense mechanisms based
on hardware obfuscation to secure computer hardware against such attacks.
The first is split manufacturing, which enables a designer to partition a
digital circuit across multiple chips, fabricate each separately, and
"glue" them together after fabrication. Since each foundry only sees a part
of the netlist, its ability to infer the design intent is hindered. I will
propose a quantitative notion of security for split manufacturing and
explore the resulting cost-security trade-offs.

In the second part of the talk, I will discuss another defense mechanism -
IC camouflaging.  IC camouflaging allows for the Boolean functionality of a
gate to be hidden from the attacker. Previous work indicates that if a
carefully selected subset of gates in the netlist is camouflaged, an
attacker is forced to use a "brute-force search" to decamouflage the
circuit.  I will present an attack that demonstrates that  IC camouflaging
is, in fact, less effective than previously thought. I will conclude with
some preliminary thoughts on provably secure IC fabrication and how it
relates to the foundational work on function obfuscation.
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