[Busec] busec this week: Sharon Goldberg (Wed 10-11am)

Sharon Goldberg goldbe at cs.bu.edu
Tue Sep 9 13:37:55 EDT 2014

I'll be giving the first busec seminar of the semester, tomorrow, about my
new surveillance law paper on Executive Order 12333.  The following Wed,
our new busec postdoc, Foteini Baldimtsi, will be talking about
transferable e-cash.  And the Wed after that, our own Leo Rezyin will
speak.  As usual, lunch is after the seminar, and abstracts are below.

Hope you can make it!

BUsec Calendar:  http://www.bu.edu/cs/busec/
BUsec Mailing list: http://cs-mailman.bu.edu/mailman/listinfo/busec

The busec seminar gratefully acknowledges the support of BU's Center for
Reliable Information Systems and Cyber Security (RISCS).


Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitution: Unrestrained Bulk
Surveillance on Americans by Collecting Network Traffic Abroad
Speaker: Sharon Goldberg, BU.
Wednesday September 10, 2014, 10:00-11am

We reveal interdependent legal and technical loopholes that the U.S.
intelligence community could use to circumvent constitutional and statutory
safeguards for Americans. We describe how the collection of American's
Internet traffic on foreign territory exploits loopholes that can leave
Americans as unprotected as foreigners by current U.S. surveillance laws.
We also describe how modern Internet protocols can be manipulated to
deliberately divert American's traffic abroad, where it can then be
collected under a more permissive legal regime (Executive Order 12333) that
is overseen solely by the Executive branch of the U.S. government.  While
the media has reported on some of the techniques we describe (eg operation
'MUSCULAR') we cannot establish the extent to which these loopholes are
exploited in practice. Instead, we seek to contribute to public
understanding of EO 12333 and its underlying policies, in particular how
advances in technology implicate the privacy protections contained

Joint work with Axel Arnbak.

Truly Anonymous Transferable E-Cash
Speaker: Foteini Baldimtsi. BU
Wednesday Sept 17, 2014  10-11am
Hariri Seminar Room, MCS180

Abstract:  Cryptographic e-cash allows off-line electronic transactions
between a bank, users and merchants in a secure and anonymous fashion. A
plethora of e-cash constructions has been proposed in the literature;
however, these traditional e-cash schemes only allow coins to be
transferred once between users and merchants. Ideally, we would like users
to be able to transfer coins between each other multiple times before
deposit, as happens with physical cash. “Transferable” e-cash schemes are
the solution to this problem. Unfortunately, the currently proposed schemes
are either not efficient at all, or do not achieve the desirable anonymity
properties without compromises, such as the existence of a judge,
responsible for persecuting double spenders, who can trace all coins and
users in the system. This paper presents the first efficient and fully
anonymous transferable e-cash scheme without a judge. We start by revising
the security and anonymity properties of transferable e-cash to capture
issues that were previously ignored. For our construction we use the
recently proposed malleable signatures by Chase et al. to allow secure and
anonymous transferring of the coins. Finally, we propose an independent,
efficient double spending detection mechanism and discuss possible real
world applications of our construction.

Joint work with: Melissa Chase, Georg Fuchsbauer, Markulf Kohlweiss
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