[Busec] Fwd: [Toc] Fwd: grad TOC courses at Harvard

Ran Canetti canetti at bu.edu
Wed Sep 3 11:31:35 EDT 2014

Some BU students might be interested as well...


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	[Toc] Fwd: grad TOC courses at Harvard
Date: 	Wed, 03 Sep 2014 09:31:59 -0400
From: 	Joanne Talbot Hanley <joanne at csail.mit.edu>
To: 	toc at csail.mit.edu

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	grad TOC courses at Harvard
Date: 	Wed, 3 Sep 2014 13:29:09 +0000
From: 	Vadhan, Salil P. <salil at seas.harvard.edu>
To: 	Joanne Talbot Hanley <joanne at csail.mit.edu>

Hi Joanne,

Some MIT TOC students might be interested in the following graduate 
courses at Harvard this term.  Can you forward the list to the 
toc-students list?



Computer Science 224 (formerly CS 226). Advanced Algorithms
Jelani Nelson
Tu., Th., 2:30-4.

Advanced algorithm design, including but not limited to amortization, 
randomization, online algorithms, graph algorithms, approximation 
algorithms, linear programming, and data structures.

Prerequisite: CS 124 and probability.


Computer Science 227r (formerly CS 220r). Topics in Cryptography and Privacy
Kobbi Nissim and Or Sheffet
Tu., Th., 11:30-1.

Topics in cryptography and data privacy drawn from the theoretical 
computer science research literature.
Focus for 2014-15: Differential Privacy -- a mathematical framework for 
privacy-preserving analysis of datasets, which enables aggregate 
computations while preventing the leakage of individual-level information.

Prerequisite: Computer Science 124, 125, or 127.


Computer Science 284r. Topics on Computation in Networks and Crowds
Yaron Singer
M., W., 10-11:30.

Topics on the design and analysis of algorithms, processes, and systems 
related to crowds and social networks.  Readings in AI, theoretical CS, 
machine learning, social science theory, economic theory, and operations 

Prerequisite: Mathematics 21b, Applied Mathematics 21b, or
equivalent; Computer Science 124, and 181 or 182, or equivalents;
or permission of instructor.


Econ 2099: Mechanism Design and Approximation
MW, 2:30-4pm, Sever Hall 202

This course studies the design of mechanisms to mediate the interaction 
of strategic individuals so that desirable outcomes are attained. A 
central theme will be the tradeoff between optimality of an objective 
such as revenue or welfare and other desirable properties such as 
simplicity, robustness, computational tractability, and practicality. 
This tradeoff will be quantified by a theory of approximation which 
measures the loss of performance of a simple, robust, and practical 
approximation mechanism in comparison to the complicated and delicate 
optimal mechanism. The class focuses on techniques for performing this 
analysis, economic conclusions, and consequences for practice. The class 
will follow the textbook manuscript at:http://jasonhartline.com/MDnA/.

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