[Busec] [charles-river-crypto-day] Reminder: This Friday (24 Oct) - The Charles River Crypto Day at MIT

Nir Bitansky nbitansky at gmail.com
Tue Oct 21 11:24:06 EDT 2014


Please join us on *Friday, October 24 at MIT for *the first Charles River 
Crypto Day <http://bostoncryptoday.wordpress.com/> of 2014-2015.

Location: MIT Stata Center  
<https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ray+and+Maria+Stata+Center,+Massachusetts+Institute+of+Technology,+Cambridge,+MA+02142/@42.3616384,-71.0906687,17z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m2!3m1!1s0x89e370a95d3025a9:0xb1de557289ff6bbe>Building 
32 Gates Tower, 8th floor Room G-882 (Hewlett).

The program and abstracts can be found below.

Hope to see you there!

Daniel, Vinod, Nir

p.s.: if someone forwarded to you this email, and you would like to join 
the mailing list for future announcements send an email to 
charles-river-crypto-day+subscribe at googlegroups.com


Program:

9:00 – 9:30.

Introduction/Coffee

9:30 – 10:30.

Ron Rivest, MIT

*Spritz—A spongy RC4-like stream cipher and hash function*

11:00 – 12:00.

Allison Bishop Lewko, Columbia

Witness Encryption and Indistinguishability Obfuscation from the 
Multilinear Subgroup Elimination Assumption

12:00 – 2:00.

Lunch (provided)

2:00 – 3:00.

Alessandro Chiesa, ETH Zurich

Scalable Zero Knowledge via Cycles of Elliptic Curves

3:30 – 4:30.

Alon Rosen, IDC Herzlia

An Algebraic Approach to Non-Malleability


Abstracts:

________________________________

Speaker: Ron Rivest (MIT)
Title/Abstract: Spritz—A spongy RC4-like stream cipher and hash function

Abtract: We reconsider the design of the stream cipher RC4, and
proposes an improved variant, which we call “Spritz”.

Our work leverages the considerable cryptanalytic work done
on the original RC4 and its proposed variants. It also uses
simulations extensively to search for biases and to guide the
selection of intermediate expressions.

We estimate that Spritz can produce output with about 24 cycles/byte
of computation. Furthermore, our statistical tests suggest that about
$2^{81}$ bytes of output are needed before one can reasonably
distinguish Spritz output from random output; this is a marked
improvement over RC4.

In addition, we formulate Spritz as a “sponge (or sponge-like)
function,” (see Bertoni et al), which can Absorb new
data at any time, and from which one can Squeeze pseudorandom
output sequences of arbitrary length. Spritz can thus be easily
adapted for use as a cryptographic hash function, an encryption
algorithm, or a message-authentication code generator. (However, in
hash-function mode, Spritz is rather slow.)

Joint work with Jacob Schuldt.
________________________________

Speaker: Allison Bishop Lewko (Cloumbia U)

Title: Witness encryption and indistinguishability obfuscation from the 
multilinear subgroup elimination assumption

Abstract:

We present constructions of witness encryption and indistinguishability 
obfuscation along with security reductions to the multilinear subgroup 
elimination assumption. This assumption is a natural multilinear extension 
of the subgroup decision assumptions used in bilineargroups. This talk is 
based on joint works with Gentry and Waters and with Gentry, Sahai and 
Waters.

________________________________

Speaker: Alessandro Chiesa (ETH Zurich)

Title: Scalable Zero Knowledge via Cycles of Elliptic Curves

Abstract: Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for general NP statements 
are a powerful cryptographic primitive. Recent work has achieved 
theoretical constructions and working implementations of zero-knowledge 
proofs that are short and easy to verify.

Alas, all prior implementations suffer from severe scalability limitations: 
the proving key’s size and the prover’s space complexity grow with the size 
of the computation being proved.

The bootstrapping technique of Bitansky et al. (STOC 2013), following 
Valiant (TCC 2008), offers an approach to scalability, by recursively 
composing proofs, but it has never been realized in practice, due to 
enormous computational cost.

In this work, by leveraging new elliptic-curve cryptographic techniques, we 
achieve the first practical implementation of recursive proof composition, 
and thereby achieve the first implementation of *scalable zero knowledge*.

Joint work with Eli Ben-Sasson, Eran Tromer, and Madars Virza.

________________________________

Speaker: Alon Rosen (IDC Herzliya)

Title: An Algebraic Approach to Non-Malleability

Abstract: I will present a new technique for constructing non-malleable 
protocols with only a single "slot". Two direct byproducts of our ideas are 
a four round non-malleable commitment and a four round non-malleable 
zero-knowledge argument, the latter matching the round complexity of the 
best known zero-knowledge arguments (without the non-malleability 
requirement). The protocols are based on the existence of one-way functions 
and admit very efficient instantiations via standard homomorphic 
commitments and sigma protocols.

Our analysis relies on algebraic reasoning, and makes use of error 
correcting codes in order to ensure that committers' tags differ in many 
coordinates.  One way of viewing our construction is as a method for 
combining many atomic sub-protocols in a way that simultaneously amplifies 
soundness and non-malleability, thus requiring much weaker guarantees to 
begin with, and resulting in a protocol which is much trimmer in complexity 
compared to the existing ones.

Joint work with Vipul Goyal, Silas Richelson and Margarita Vald.

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