[Busec] busec this week: Jamie Morgenstern (Wed 10am)

Sharon Goldberg goldbe at cs.bu.edu
Sun Apr 6 19:27:29 EDT 2014


This week we have a talk by Jamie Morgenstern from CMU as part of our
privacy year series.  The talk will be at the usual time.

See you there!

Sharon

 BUsec Calendar:  http://www.bu.edu/cs/busec/
 BUsec Mailing list: http://cs-mailman.bu.edu/mailman/listinfo/busec
 How to get to BU from MIT: The CT2 bus or MIT's "Boston Daytime Shuttle"
http://web.mit.edu/facilities/transportation/shuttles/daytime_boston.html

****
Privacy-Preserving Public Information for Sequential Games
Jamie Morgenstern, CMU
Wed, April 9, 10am - 11:30am
MCS137


 In settings with incomplete information, players can find it
  difficult to coordinate to find states with good social welfare. For
  example, in financial settings, if a collection of financial firms
  have limited information about each other's strategies, some large
  number of them may choose the same high-risk investment in hopes of
  high returns. While this might be acceptable in some cases, the
  economy can be hurt badly if many firms make investments in the same
  risky market segment and it fails. One reason why many firms might
  end up choosing the same segment is that they do not have
  information about other firms' investments (imperfect information
  may lead to `bad' game states). Directly reporting all players'
  investments, however, raises confidentiality concerns for both
  individuals and institutions.

  In this paper, we explore whether information about the game-state
  can be publicly announced in a manner that maintains the privacy of
  the actions of the players, and still suffices to deter players from
reaching bad game-states. We show that in many games of interest, it is
possible for players to avoid these bad states with the help of
\emph{privacy-preserving, publicly-announced information}. We model
behavior of players in this imperfect information setting in two ways --
greedy and undominated strategic behaviours, and we prove guarantees on
social welfare that certain kinds of privacy-preserving information can
help attain. Furthermore, we design a counter with improved privacy
 guarantees under continual observation.

Joint work with Avrim Blum, Adam Smith, and Ankit Sharma
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