[Busec] Fwd: Microsoft Research New England Weekly Event Digest

Sharon Goldberg goldbe at cs.bu.edu
Thu Oct 11 15:22:20 EDT 2012

Slightly off topic, but Myerson will be giving a talk at MSR-NE next
week (Oct 18) that some might be interested in.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Irene Money <irenem at microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 3:04 PM
Subject: Microsoft Research New England Weekly Event Digest
To: Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe at gmail.com>

Microsoft Research New England Weekly Event Digest

Here is a digest of the upcoming talks sponsored by the Microsoft
Research New England Lab, including a talk tomorrow, Friday, as well
as those happening next week:

MSR Seminar: Work in Progress: YouTube's Architecture and the
Celestial Capture Card – Hector Postigo, Temple University | Fri, Oct
12 @ 1:30 PM

MSR Seminar: Two-Sided Matching with One-Sided Preferences – Guillaume
Haeringer, Stanford University and Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona |
 Wed, Oct 17 @ 4 PM

MSR Colloquium: A Model Of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles – Roger Myerson,
Chicago | Thur, Oct 18 @ 1:30 PM

Public Lecture: Predicting and Understanding the 2012 Election --
David Rothschild, Microsoft Research New York City | Fri, Oct 19 @
11:30 AM

Upon arrival, be prepared to show a picture ID and sign the Building
Visitor Log when approaching the Lobby Floor Security Desk. Alert them
to the name of the MSR event you are attending and ask them to direct
you to the appropriate floor. Typically the talks are located in the
First Floor Conference Center, however sometimes the location may

More details follow:

WHO:                          Hector Postigo
AFFILIATION:             School of Communication, Temple University
TITLE:                         Work in Progress: YouTube's
Architecture and the Celestial Capture Card
HOST:                         Nancy Baym
WHEN:                        Friday, October 12
WHERE:                     Microsoft Conference Center located at One
Memorial Drive, First Floor, Cambridge, MA
SCHEDULE:               1:30 PM – 3:00 PM
Taking examples from current research, I am developing a framework for
understanding how YouTube’s technical feature-set creates a system of
capture and conversion.  Capture describes the persistent ways in
which social web platforms record and fix online/offline social and
technical practices.  Conversion applies to the way in which technical
architectures convert what is captured into value (both culturally
contingent and economic). The notions of capture and conversion are
developed in light of other work in the field that seeks to understand
how social web platforms use technology to leverage user generated
content (UGC).  The framework bridges a focus on ongoing social
practice within and through platforms with analysis of technology as a
determinant of probable practice.

Hector Postigo is an Associate Professor, School of Communication,
Temple University. Learn more at his blog:
WHO:                          Guillaume Haeringer
AFFILIATION:             Stanford University and Universitat Autonoma
de Barcelona
TITLE:                         Two-Sided Matching with One-Sided Preferences
HOST:                         Nicole Immorlica
WHEN:                        Wednesday, October 17
WHERE:                     Microsoft Conference Center located at One
Memorial Drive, 1st Floor, Barton, Cambridge, MA
SCHEDULE:               4:00 PM – 5:00 PM
In most centralized matching markets (like school choice problems)
participants usually submit small preference lists. This paper is
aimed at showing that short preference lists can provide additional
information that can be used to match agents. We show that considering
only schools priorities and the set of acceptable schools for each
student (but not their submitted preferences) we can restrict the set
of possible stable matchings that can arise for any students'
preference profile that leave unchanged the set of acceptable schools.
Part of our contribution consists of linking Hall's marriage condition
to stable matchings. We show that in stable matching school choice
mechanism with district priorities the presence of correlation on the
set of schools students apply to (but not necessarily correlation on
the preferences over those schools) can significantly decrease
geographical mobility. We also propose a new mechanism for school
choice problems that (weakly) Pareto dominates the Student Optimal
Stable Mechanism, and show that it is a dominant strategy to always
rank truthfully the schools that have been revealed as acceptable.
Joint work with Vincent Lehlé.

Guillaume Haeringer is an associate professor at Universitat Autònoma
de Barcelona. He received his Ph.D. from Université Louis Pasteur in
2000. After being a Marie Curie Fellow at the Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona, he was lecturer at the Universit of Warwick. He joined the
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona as a faculty in 2002-2003 with a
Ramon y Cajal fellowship. His research focuses on game theory and
matching theory. Guillaume Haeringer is currently a visiting associate
professor at Stanford University.
WHO:                          Roger Myerson
AFFILIATION:             Chicago
TITLE:                         A Model Of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles
HOST:                         Adam Kalai
WHEN:                        Thursday, October 18
WHERE:                     Microsoft Conference Center located at One
Memorial Drive, 10th & 11th Floor, Cambridge, MA
SCHEDULE:               1:30 PM – 3:00 PM
This paper considers a simple model of credit cycles driven by moral
hazard in financial intermediation. Investment advisors or bankers
must earn moral-hazard rents, but the cost of these rents can be
efficiently spread over a banker's entire career, by promising large
back-loaded rewards if the banker achieves a record of consistently
successful investments. The dynamic interactions among different
generations of bankers can create equilibrium credit cycles with
repeated booms and recessions. We find conditions when taxing workers
to subsidize bankers can increase investment and employment enough to
make the workers better off.
The paper is at  http://home.uchicago.edu/~rmyerson/research/index.html

Roger Myerson is the Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of
Economics at the University of Chicago.  He has made seminal
contributions to the fields of economics and political science. In
game theory, he introduced refinements of Nash's equilibrium concept,
and he developed techniques to characterize the effects of
communication when individuals have different information. His
analysis of incentive constraints in economic communication introduced
some of the fundamental ideas in mechanism design theory, including
the revelation principle and the revenue-equivalence theorem in
auctions and bargaining. Professor Myerson has also applied
game-theoretic tools to political science, analyzing how political
incentives can be affected by different electoral systems and
constitutional structures.
    Myerson is the author of Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (1991)
and Probability Models for Economic Decisions (2005). He also has
published numerous articles in Econometrica, the Journal of Economic
Theory, Games and Decisions, and the International Journal of Game
Theory, for which he served as an editorial board member for 10 years.
    Professor Myerson has a PhD from Harvard University and taught for
25 years in the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern
University before coming to the University of Chicago in 2001. He is a
member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the
National Academy of Sciences. In 2007, he was awarded the 2007 Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in recognition of his
contributions to mechanism design theory.
Please join Microsoft Research New England for a compelling public
lecture: Predicting and Understanding the 2012 Election.
Microsoft Research New England will occasionally host public lectures
of broad interest. We welcome those interested to attend. Please
register if you plan on attending.

Public Lecture: Predicting and Understanding the 2012 Election
David Rothschild, Microsoft Research New York City | To learn more
about David visit:
Friday, October 19, 2012, 11:30 AM to 1:00 PM

For over 75 years forecasting of elections has been static; ask a
random sample of representative group of voters who they would vote
for if the election were held today and report the poll result. First,
I demonstrate that the same samples could be addressed with other
questions to produce a more accurate standard forecast (i.e., binary
winner and/or expected vote share). Second, I challenge the standard
forecast; what most stakeholders really want and need are more
innovative forecasts like probability of victory or even probability
distributions. Third, I show how both standard and innovative
forecasts can be made more efficient with the new methods that utilize
more cost effective non-representative samples and, in time, passively
generated social media data. Fourth, I show how Microsoft is going to
be a leader in this new innovation. Finally, I will tell you who is
going to win the election.

David Rothschild is an economist at Microsoft Research in New York
City. He has a Ph.D. in applied economics from the Wharton School of
Business at the University of Pennsylvania. He has written
extensively, in both the academic and popular press, on polling,
prediction markets, and predictions of upcoming events; most of his
popular work has focused on predicting elections and an economist take
on public policy. He has academic papers that cover the following
interest areas: political economy, behavior economics/public opinion,
public economics/public policy, industrial organization, and
experimental economics. After joining Microsoft in May he has been
busy building prediction and sentiment models, and organizing
novel/experimental polling and prediction games.

For more information, please visit

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Sharon Goldberg
Computer Science, Boston University

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