[Busec] BUsec this week: Nadia Heninger (Tues Oct 9, 10am MCS137)

Sharon Goldberg goldbe at cs.bu.edu
Sun Oct 7 19:26:33 EDT 2012


This week, on *Tuesday*, Nadia Heninger from MSR will speak about her USENIX
security best paper on detecting weak RSA and DSA keys, on Tuesday Oct
9 at 10AM.

The following week, Alessandro Chiesa from MIT will tell us how
proof-carrying data makes delegation more affordable (Monday Oct 15 at
10AM.)  Also on Thursday of next week, CS is also hosting a talk on
cybersecurity with the International Relations department that some
folks on this list may be interested in.

As usual, BUsec talks will be in MCS137 at 111 Cummington St, Boston, with
lunch provided; the CS/IR talk will be at Hariri.  Abstracts below.


BUsec Calendar:  https://sites.google.com/site/busecuritygroup/calendar
BUsec Mailing list:  http://cs-mailman.bu.edu/mailman/listinfo/busec

"Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices"
Speaker: Nadia Heninger, MSR.
*** TUESDAY***** Oct 9, 2012, 10:00am – 11:30am in MCS 137

RSA and DSA can fail catastrophically when used with malfunctioning
random number generators, but the extent to which these problems arise
in practice has never been comprehensively studied at Internet scale.
We perform the largest ever network survey of TLS and SSH servers and
present evidence that vulnerable keys are surprisingly widespread. We
find that 0.75% of TLS certificates share keys due to insufficient
entropy during key generation, and we suspect that another 1.70% come
from the same faulty implementations and may be susceptible to
compromise. Even more alarmingly, we are able to obtain RSA private
keys for 0.50% of TLS hosts and 0.03% of SSH hosts, because their
public keys shared nontrivial common factors due to entropy problems,
and DSA private keys for 1.03% of SSH hosts, because of insufficient
signature randomness. We cluster and investigate the vulnerable hosts,
finding that the vast majority appear to be headless or embedded
devices. In experiments with three software components commonly used
by these devices, we are able to reproduce the vulnerabilities and
identify specific software behaviors that induce them, including a
boot-time entropy hole in the Linux random number generator. Finally,
we suggest defenses and draw lessons for developers, users, and the
security community.

Joint work with Zakir Durumeric, Eric Wustrow, and J. Alex Halderman


Title: How Proof-Carrying Data Makes Delegation More Affordable
Speaker: Alessandro Chiesa
Monday October 15,  10AM


Succinct arguments are computationally-sound proof systems that allow
verifying NP statements with lower complexity than required for
classical NP verification

In this talk, we will discuss two important efficiency aspects of
succinct arguments:
(1) the time and space complexity of the prover
(2) the offline complexity of the verifier (a.k.a. preprocessing complexity)

We will look at how well (or badly) do existing succinct argument
constructions perform with respect to the above aspects. We will then
discuss how the framework of proof-carrying data can be used to
"bootstrap" non-interactive succinct arguments that suffer from
expensive offline complexity or poor prover complexity (or both) into
SNARKs that no longer suffer from either.
Overall, we achieve a solution that performs very well relative to the
above aspects.

Joint work with Nir Bitansky, Ran Canetti, and Eran Tromer.


 “What Increases the Probability of Cyber War?: Bringing International
Relations Theory Back In”

 Timothy Junio

Thursday, October 18,  12:15 to 2:00 p.m. (Lunch will be available at 11:45 a.m)
 Venue: Hariri Institute Seminar Room – 111 Cummington Street, Boston University

Timothy J. Junio (Tim) is a fifth-year doctoral candidate of political
science at the University of Pennsylvania, and during the 2012-2013
academic year will be a predoctoral fellow at the Center for
International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University
(co-funded by the Hoover Institution). He also develops new cyber
capabilities for the US military and intelligence community as a
researcher with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

Few IR scholars have sought to explain the conditions under which
states are likely to use coercion in cyberspace, or more generally how
states should be expected to behave in this new security environment.
Those who have tend to emphasize the improbability of cyber war. In
contrast to rationalist causes of war theories that predict an
equilibrium of mutually defensive cyber strategies in the
international system, Junio presents an argument elevating domestic
political factors with the potential to escalate to the offensive use
of cyber power.

This event is sponsored by the Center for International Relations at
BU and the Computer Science Department at BU.

Seats are limited so please let us know by Monday, October 15, if you
plan to attend: lbpuyat at bu.edu

Sharon Goldberg
Computer Science, Boston University

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