[Busec] TODAY's!! MIT TOC Colloquium with Silvio Micali

Sharon Goldberg goldbe at cs.bu.edu
Tue Feb 14 13:59:54 EST 2012


FYI
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Be Blackburn <be at csail.mit.edu>

	  TOC COLLOQUIUM
          Open to the Public

DATE:     TODAY - Tuesday, February 14, 2012
TITLE:    Knightian Auctions
SPEAKER:  Silvio Micali, CSAIL, MIT
SNACKS:   3:45 pm in the RSA G5 Lounge
TALK:     4:15 pm in 32-155 on the 1st floor of StataABSTRACT:

In an auction, a player may not exactly know his own valuation, or its
distribution. We thus study single-good auctions whose players know
their own valuations only within a multiplicative factor (e.g.,
10%). The notions of implementation in dominant and undominated
strategies are naturally extended to this setting, but their power is
vastly different. Namely,
(1) We prove that no dominant-strategy mechanism can guarantee more
social welfare than by assigning the good at random; but
(2) We prove that a much better performance can be obtained via
undominated-strategy mechanisms, and actually provide tight upper and
lower bounds for the fraction of the maximum social welfare
guaranteable by such mechanisms, whether deterministic or
probabilistic.

Joint work with Alessandro Chiesa and Zeyuan Zhu


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-- 
Sharon Goldberg
Computer Science, Boston University
http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe
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