[Busec] Vassilis Zikas - 2 talks next week - Tues, Thurs 10:30-12

Ran Canetti canetti at tau.ac.il
Fri Oct 7 15:39:07 EDT 2011

Guys, I think we'll do the talks in the reverse order: The Tuesday talk 
will be on Synchronous Computation and the Thursday talk on Corruptible 
Setups. Sorry for the confusion.


On 10/7/2011 12:28 PM, Sharon Goldberg wrote:
> Hi BUsec,
> Next week Vassilis Zikas is visiting us from UMd.  Since Monday is a
> day off, there is no group meeting then, but instead he'll be giving
> two talks on Tuesday and Thursday:
> The first talk: Secure Computation with Corruptible Setups
> Tuesday 10:30-11:30 in MCS137
> The Second talk: Universally Composable Synchronous Computation
> Thursday 10:30-11:30 in MCS144
> Snacks etc will be provided. Abstracts below.  Also, for those of you
> that have never seen a talk on the universal composability framework,
> I really recommend you attend at least the first talk.
> See you next week,
> Sharon
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Ran Canetti<canetti at tau.ac.il>
> Title: Secure Computation with Corruptible Setups
> Abstract:
> Universally composable (UC) protocols satisfy strong and
> desirable security properties. Unfortunately, soon after the
> introduction of the UC framework it was shown that in the
> ``plain'' model most cryptographic tasks cannot be realized
> without an honest majority. Researchers since then have
> therefore proposed various forms of ``trusted setup'', and have
> shown many setups that are \emph{complete} and can thus be
> leveraged to securely carry out any desired task.
> With only a few notable exceptions, past work has viewed these
> setup assumptions as being implemented by some ideal,
> incorruptible entity. In reality, however, setups would likely
> be carried out by some mechanism that could be subverted, or by
> some party that could be compromised. Most prior work provides
> no guarantees in such cases.
> We propose here a clean, general, and generic approach for
> modeling potential corruption of setups within the UC
> framework, where such corruption might be fail-stop, passive,
> or arbitrary and is in addition to possible corruption of the
> parties. We also show several results regarding feasibility in
> this model for these corruption types (and their combinations)  for
> different specifications of the corruptible sets. For example, we show
> that given $m$ complete setups, any $t$ of which might be
> actively corrupted, general secure computation is possible iff
> $t<m/2$ even when arbitrarily many parties are actively corrupted.
> This is joint work with Jonathan Katz, Aggelos Kiayias, and Hong-Sheng Zhou.
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> Title: Universally Composable Synchronous Computation
>>>> Abstract.
>>>>> In synchronous networks, protocols can achieve security guarantees that
>>>>> are not possible in an asynchronous world: i.e., they can simultaneously
>>>>> achieve input completeness (all honest parties' inputs are included in
>>>>> the computation) and guaranteed termination (honest parties do not
>>>>> "hang" indefinitely). In practice truly synchronous networks rarely
>>>>> exist, but synchrony can be emulated if channels have (known) latency
>>>>> and parties have loosely synchronized clocks.
>>>>> The framework of universal composability (UC) is inherently
>>>>> asynchronous, but several approaches for adding synchrony to the
>>>>> framework have been proposed. However, we show that the existing
>>>>> proposals do not provide the expected guarantees. Given this, we propose
>>>>> a "clean slate" approach to defining synchrony in the UC framework by
>>>>> introducing functionalities exactly meant to model, respectively,
>>>>> bounded-delay networks and loosely synchronized clocks. We show that the
>>>>> expected guarantees of synchronous computation can be realized given
>>>>> these functionalities, and that previous models can all be expressed
>>>>> within our new framework.
>>>>> This is joint work with Jonathan Katz, Ueli Maurer, and Bjoern
>>>>> Tackmann.
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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