[Busec] Fwd: [Theory-seminars] Next Tuesday's MIT ToC colloquium with Silvio Micali

Sharon Goldberg goldbe at cs.bu.edu
Tue Jan 25 12:09:44 EST 2011

Another possibly interesting seminar.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Be Blackburn <be at csail.mit.edu>
Date: Tue, Jan 25, 2011 at 10:36 AM
Subject: [Theory-seminars] Next Tuesday's MIT ToC colloquium with Silvio Micali
To: theory-seminars at csail.mit.edu, seminars at csail.mit.edu

               Open to the Public

DATE:          Tuesday, February 1, 2011
TITLE:         The Second-Knowledge Mechanism
SPEAKER:  Silvio Micali, TOC, CSAIL, MIT
SNACKS:     3:45 pm in the RSA G5 Lounge
TALK:           4:15 pm in 32-144 on the 1st floor of Stata


In auctions of a single good, we consider a new revenue benchmark
that always lies between the highest and second-highest valuation,
prove that no classical mechanism can achieve it (or even slightly
approximate it) in any robust way, and provide a new mechanism that
perfectly and robustly achieve it.

Our work puts forward a new set-theoretic way of modeling and
leveraging the knowledge that the players may have about their

Joint work with Jing Chen

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Sharon Goldberg
Computer Science, Boston University

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